Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[Jason A. Donenfeld]

On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 9:43 PM, Joe Anakata
<jea-signup-cgit at anakata.org> wrote:
> (Also it was mentioned this would only work for people making a fresh
> clone; anyone with an existing clone would almost certainly know
> something was up.)

No, definitely a MITM attack is feasible that would be fast
forwardable just fine for a pull onto an existing repo.

> Also there is the issue of the book reference, which is hard to
> change.  Though, for this, you could just have a dummy server which
> redirects people, something which is essentially:
>
> nc -l -p 9418 -c "echo -n 002AERR please use https://foo.bar/foo.git"

Right, this is exactly what I wound up doing, except much higher
performance using epoll:
https://git.zx2c4.com/git-daemon-dummy/about/
I haven't decided whether or not to deploy it, but the code is there.

> (Of course, someone could still MITM *that*.

Right. But the idea, anyhow, would just be to let the readers of the
book know what's up, rather than leaving them in the dark.