Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning
Jason A. Donenfeld
Jason at zx2c4.com
Tue Feb 23 06:08:24 CET 2016
On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:19 AM, Eric Wong <normalperson at yhbt.net> wrote:
> I suggest keeping git:// running as automated mirrors may not be
> monitored very closely or easily updated.
That's a good point. I'd forgotten about automated mirrors. I'll keep
logs of the git:// pulls for a month or so and see if there are any
regular pullers and also if I can track down the source IP. Perhaps
it's a manageable pool of people to switch over.
> git already has plenty of integrity checking built-in and
> getting the proper hashes for the heads/tags over a
> trusted-enough medium is enough (or reading the fine code).
No, git's built-in integrity protection really is not sufficient if
the transport is compromised.
> And as others have said, HTTPS isn't impenetrable
I'd like some specific details on this repeated claim.
> the CA system is still a major problem.
True. But there doesn't appear to be a widely deployed alternative.
> Also, TLS libraries can introduce new bugs and vulnerabilities
> like Heartbleed.
This is true, but I already require a public TLS deployment, so it's
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