[pass] Key rotation

[Lie Ryan]

If you suspect your master password has been compromised, you should change all your passwords. At that point, you essentially are creating a new password store from scratch.

On December 14, 2015 11:22:41 AM GMT+11:00, commentsabout at riseup.net wrote:
>Hello,
>
>On 2015-12-06 23:34, Lucas Hoffmann wrote:
>> The man page says you should use "pass init [-p subfolder] newid". 
>Or
>> do you need some info that is not in the man page?
>
>On 2015-12-07 12:22, Martijn van Dijk wrote:
>> I just did this, you can run pass init <key ID 1> <key ID 2> and it 
>> will
>> re-encrypt all the stored passwords with both key 1 and 2. You can
>> probably use this to remove the old key too.
>
>My bad, I should have RTFM more carefully (I only greped "rotation"). 
>That's exactly what I was looking for.
>
>Thank you.
>
>On 2015-12-06 23:37, Emil Lundberg wrote:
>> I'd like to provide a friendly reminder that if you do that, make
>sure 
>> to
>> also (securely) delete all copies of your password store encrypted
>with 
>> the
>> old key(s) as they can still be decrypted with the old key(s). This
>> includes old commits if you use git to version your repository, as
>well 
>> as
>> any backups you may have.
>> 
>> I'm not saying rotating keys is a bad idea, just that this is
>something 
>> you
>> need to keep in mind if you do.
>
>Of course.
>
>On 2015-12-07 08:32, Mike Charlton wrote:
>> On 7 December 2015 at 08:37, Emil Lundberg <lundberg.emil at gmail.com> 
>> wrote:
>>> I'm not saying rotating keys is a bad idea, just that this is 
>>> something
>>> you need to keep in mind if you do.
>> 
>> I'm not sure  why it would be considered a good idea.  Unless I'm 
>> missing
>> something the reason for rotating your password is to ensure that if
>> someone has gotten access to it somehow, they have limited time to
>make 
>> use
>> of it.   Since your old key is still active, that argument doesn't 
>> apply.
>> It just makes key management more difficult.  Unless you export 
>> everything
>> out and re-encrypt it, I would say that rotating keys *is* a bad
>idea.
>
>Because at some point, you might want/need to change key: because you 
>believe it could have been compromised (and therefore want to
>re-encrypt 
>your password-store and get rid of the version encrypted with the 
>potentially compromised key asap) ; because you want to use stronger 
>crypto (generate a new – longer – key, switch to ECC,...), … There are 
>tens of reasons I can think of that would require key rotation.
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