[pass] [PATCH] Allow custom subcommands

Brian Candler b.candler at pobox.com
Fri Oct 7 09:41:17 CEST 2016


On 07/10/2016 08:28, Sylvain Viart wrote:
> But what about non-programmer user?
> I can't tell them to do that, right.
>
> Some time, (often) I don't have time to review the code myself, I need
> to trust the system, and free my mind about this issue. For example
> running a GNU/Linux distrib + passwordstore, lets say I'm trusting that,
> so I can go.
>
> That was more my point. .deb packages are signed and reviewed by some
> volunteer, I don't know if the system is perfect or not, but I'm
> trusting it.;-)

So the obvious options are:

1. package pass itself as a .deb package, and all the plugins as .deb 
packages. Tell the user never to install any software from any other source.

(They will still need to add your apt repository, and its signing key, 
but that's a one-off task)

2. Simpler: give the user trusted URLs from where they can download pass 
and pass plugins (for example: trusted github accounts). Tell them not 
to install from anywhere else.

If you're being extra safe, tell them to checkout a specific commit of 
each plugin.

I can't see any way in which adding plugin signatures to pass itself is 
helpful. How are you going to choose which signatures to trust? Either 
pass is hard-coded with a list of trusted plugin authors, or you have to 
add the author keys too. In which case this is no better than either of 
the previous options.

There are many worse weaknesses in the system. What's to stop the user 
removing the passphrase from their private key? Or decrypting all the 
keys from the password repository and leaving them in their /home directory?



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