user gone and expiring access

Jake Yip jake.yip at ardc.edu.au
Fri Feb 22 02:04:38 CET 2019


On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 9:37 AM higuita <higuita at gmx.net> wrote:

>
> Of course i'm not talking about a malicious user directly, those can dump
> everything as plain text, it's more protecting "personal" backups and
> copies
> stored in other places that we may not trust in a long run.
>
>
This means NOT storing your encrypted keys on a local device, but storing
them in a (online) place where you can easily revoke access to. I have
found keybase and their keybase filesystem to work for me (
https://keybase.io/docs/kbfs).


> Maybe pass could generate a key that expires after x days and double
> encrypt
> everything using first the key with the expiration date and then the user
> key.
> A small deamon (or even a cron) could keep the expiration key valid by
> generating
> a new one and reencrypt. Users that still have access can do a git pull and
> get the updated info. Users that fail to update will be unable to decrypt
> the
> content after the key was expired.
>
> Pass could remove the expired key automatically if expired, to avoid the
> faketime
> loophole of timetravel back to when the key was still valid.
>

It works similarly to your double encrypt idea. The encrypted pass files on
KBFS is encrypted again with a device specific key. The pass files are
streamed to your machine and decrypted when needed. You can revoke a device
and it will not be able to get the encrypted pass files anymore.

Regards,
-- 
Jake Yip
DevOps Engineer
M +61 383 443 669 <+61+383+443+669>
jake.yip at ardc.edu.au <tsuey.cham at ardc.edu.au>
ardc.edu.au <http://www.ardc.edu.au>
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