XSS in cgit

[Ferry Huberts]

On 14/01/16 12:07, John Keeping wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 14, 2016 at 12:01:57PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>> On Thu, Jan 14, 2016 at 11:57 AM, John Keeping <john at keeping.me.uk> wrote:
>>> I wonder if we should just drop support for the "mimetype" query
>>> parameter and see if anyone complains.  In general, I would expect it to
>>> be the server's responsibility to decide on the type of its output and
>>> allowing the client to override it seems like a problem in general.
>>
>> Agreed here.
>>

Me too.

>> We still have the other issue of git repos containing valid html with
>> malicious scripts and whatnot, though. Can we simply kill the feature
>> of allowing HTML to be served from cgit? This would indeed fix the
>> security issue in the best way. But would folks complain?
>
> Unlike the "mimetype" query parameter, I can see valid usecases for
> serving HTML from repositories with CGit (I've even used it myself in
> the past), so I expect there will be complaints for that one.
>
> Could we add a config knob for serving HTML and turn if off by default?
> That will allow people who trust their repository contents to use this
> feature while protecting everyone else.

Good idea.
With a big fat warning that enabling it will possibly open you up to XSS 
attacks, especially when the repo is not under your control