passtos patch

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor]

On Thu 2018-01-18 17:11:16 +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Not sure the infoleak is worth it.
>
> List: thoughts?

I don't think the infoleak is worth it.  Certainly not by default.

and i know wg doesn't want to have a lot of fiddly knobs, so if it's not
by default, please don't add a fiddly knob here.

As just one scenario where it's harmful, consider the case where your
ISP wants to sell you VoIP service.  They have a concrete financial
incentive to delay or add jitter to packets coming from you marked with
common VoIP ToS markings if your VoIP connections are not made through
their competing service.  If your VoIP traffic goes out via wireguard,
your ISP will damage it to try to convince you that their service is
what you should be using :/

The goal of wireguard-style tunnelling is to avoid leaking information
about what the user is actively doing.  Let's not introduce exceptions
where we actively try to export otherwise-confidential information
outside the encrypted envelope.

        --dkg
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